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1. Introduction
Though mankind has struggled against malaria for countless generations, it remains a major
global health problem. The malaria parasite and the Anopheles mosquito have evolved and
developed with mankind since earliest recorded history, but there is nothing inevitable about
the disease. Although thousands of children die from malaria every year, the disease is
preventable and entirely curable, and the history of malaria control in the 20th century
demonstrates that with the right tools and funding, malaria can be controlled, or even
eradicated. The key, of course, is the cost-effective use of the right tools.
2. Statement of the problem
This chapter will examine arguably the most important tool for malaria control – public health
insecticides (PHIs). Insecticide opponents often mischaracterize the public health use of
insecticides, to include how they are used and consequences of their use in public health
programs. Common inferences are that public health use of insecticides results in broad-scale
environmental contamination and harm to wildlife. It is important for the reader to understand
that there are internationally accepted guidelines for public health use of insecticides and that
public health use is very different from how insecticides are used for agriculture. Optimum
public health use of PHIs is to spray small quantities on inside walls of houses. In the case of
DDT, it is approved only for use in public health programs. Applying it to inside walls
leverages DDT’s powerful repellent actions, giving continual protection from malaria-infected
mosquitoes, for months on end, to those living inside the sprayed house. It should be obvious
that a small amount of an insecticide on house walls is a far cry from spraying insecticides on
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vast acreages of cropland, as one might envisage for insecticides used in agriculture. Thus we
emphasize that the subject of this chapter is public health use of insecticides, with no conno‐
tations whatsoever for the use of insecticides in agriculture.
We will summarize, with specific examples, the way that modern PHIs, and DDT in particular,
have saved millions of lives since the 1940s. Despite this remarkable achievement, popular
campaigns by activists, some scientists and even United Nations (UN) agencies, have stigma‐
tized and often demonized PHIs. Instead of regarding insecticides in the same light as
medicines and diagnostics, essential elements of a malaria control program, insecticide
opponents have mounted vocal campaigns to halt their use. Frequently these campaigns avoid
or ignore the scientific process and rely on the flimsiest of evidence to make great claims about
human health or ecological effects of PHIs. We will characterize examples of studies and claims
against PHIs used by the activist communities and we will describe the major failings of each
as they relate to the use of PHIs.
The claims by those who oppose PHIs, as we will explain and demonstrate with specific
examples, do not comply with even the most basic epidemiologic criteria to prove a cause and
effect relationship – yet those claims drive public opinion and policy. We will also document
how UN bureaucrats have made outrageous claims that malaria can be controlled without
PHIs. At the same time, the UN has set grand goals of achieving near-zero deaths from malaria
by 2015. There is a valid debate to be had about whether or not this goal can be met, or even
properly defined and measured; however, what is clear, is that progress against malaria cannot
be achieved and sustained without access to PHIs. For access to be secured, the malaria
community, including program managers, researchers, advocates and others, must defend
PHIs rigorously and emphatically. The overarching goal of this chapter is to help with that
defense. Without it, the lives of men, women and children living at risk of malaria will be
greatly imperiled. However, for proper defense of PHIs, there must be a clear understanding
about how insecticide opponents have succeeded in past anti-insecticide campaigns, and that
influential groups and UN organizations actively oppose the use of PHIs. As anti-insecticide
campaigners employ distinct strategies and tactics, it is important to know what they are and
how they are used.
3. Malaria control today versus the early years of PHI use
Today there is great enthusiasm and substantial funding to advance global efforts to control
and, in some regions, eradicate malaria. Indeed, and as suggested by recent outcomes of control
programs, we are beginning to see promising results [1,2]. The necessary change for refocusing
efforts to control malaria started in 1998, when, faced with mounting evidence that the global
burden of malaria was increasing, and had been for some time, the World Health Organization
(WHO) formed a new malaria control partnership, Roll Back Malaria (RBM). The RBM
Partnership is made up of WHO and several UN agencies, such as UNICEF and UNDP, and
development agencies, such as the World Bank and the US Agency for International Devel‐
opment (USAID), along with the private sector and NGOs. RBM’s stated goal in 1998 was to
halve the burden of malaria by 2010 [3].
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RBM began with limited funding and an apparent disdain for scientific evidence. The early
efforts were disappointing. Far from achieving any reduction in malaria cases, by 2004 there
was evidence that malaria cases were in fact increasing. RBM was described in a stinging
editorial in the British Medical Journal as a ‘failing public health campaign [4].’ One of the main
reasons for this was the Partnership’s dogged support for the use of insecticide treated bednets
(ITNs) over other vector control interventions, e.g., indoor residual spraying (IRS) with
insecticides such as DDT. The limited and controlled spraying of insecticides inside houses
has long been known to rapidly reduce malaria cases and deaths, yet in the early years of the
RBM Partnership was roundly ignored. In addition RBM’s Partners failed to support any
change in treatment policy away from failing drug therapies to the new artemisinin-based
combination therapies (ACTs).
It was not until 2006 that progress against malaria finally started to be made. To its credit RBM
acknowledged some of the problems it faced and set about restructuring and reforming. Much
of impetus for these reforms came from a newly appointed head of the WHO’s Global Malaria
Program, Dr. Arata Kochi. Dr. Kochi had little history in malaria control and perhaps because
of this had no need to defend any misguided previous policy decisions. One of Kochi’s first
acts was to re-issue WHO’s treatment guidelines, recommending ACTs.
Shortly thereafter Kochi re-addressed WHO’s policy on both DDT and IRS, and in a public
and, for WHO, aggressive gesture issued a statement strongly endorsing the use of DDT. At
the same time the US global malaria control program run by USAID underwent a major reform,
creating the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI). A distinguishing feature of the PMI, which
sets it apart from other major bi-lateral donor funded malaria control programs, is its support
for IRS and its willingness to pay for use of DDT [5].
Together these reforms marked a change in global malaria control and as a result, malaria cases
began to decline. As described below, malaria funding increased by more than 20 fold in a
decade and malaria deaths, according to WHO modeling data, have fallen.
Malaria funding for the PMI and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (Global Fund)
through 2011 is estimated at $1,858,370,500 for the PMI [6], and $6,156,000,000 in malaria grants
through 2011 for the Global Fund (based on $22.8b value of grant portfolio as of December 31,
2011, of which 27% is for malaria) [7].
International funding for malaria control has gone from less than $100 million in 2000 to $2
billion in 2011 [8]. Likewise, the estimated changes in global malaria burden since 2000 are
compliant with improved funding of control efforts after 2005. For example, estimated
numbers of malaria cases and malaria deaths in 2000 were 223 million and 755,000 respectively.
In 2005 the values were 237 million cases and 801,000 deaths, whereas in 2011, the values were
216 million cases and 655,000 deaths [8].
Clearly progress is being made in the renewed focus on malaria. The positive changes with
regard to funding IRS and DDT’s place in malaria control are obviously welcomed. However
these advances can be reversed at any time and as we explain in this chapter, the forces
opposing the careful and effective use of PHIs are well-funded, organized, and aggressive. The
malaria control community should remember, and learn from history, that we have been at
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this stage before. We can get a sense of this by looking back to what was happening in 1959.
At this time DDT was used widely in agriculture and for pest management around the world.
Aerial spraying of DDT was common as farmers sought to protect their crops, but in malaria
control DDT use was entirely different. Most malaria vectors enter houses in search of blood
meals, and so protecting people while they are at home, often asleep, is crucial. Soon after the
Allied forces first used DDT during World War II, scientists discovered that DDT acts primarily
as a spatial repellent. In other words, if the interior of a house is sprayed with DDT, mosquitoes
are driven away and are unlikely to enter. DDT will also act as a contact irritant, so if a mosquito
lands on a sprayed surface, it is likely to exit the house rapidly, often before feeding. Of course
DDT will also act as a toxicant, killing the mosquito. However it is a relatively weak toxicant
and its spatial repellency is the insecticide's most important mode of action by far. Widespread
area spraying of DDT would have been pointless for malaria control.
In 1959 malaria was in rapid retreat in many endemic countries as a consequence of effective
DDT use. The global malaria eradication program was just barely underway. By that time, the
malaria control community had already used DDT to free 300 million people from the burdens
of endemic disease. By the program’s end in 1969, the lives of almost one billion people would
be equally improved. In 1959 there was a wealth of malaria control expertise, substantial
funding, and programmatic emphasis on malaria prevention; there were powerful and
successful national programs, goal-oriented malaria control policies, and great enthusiasm for
the goals of the global program. We suggest that few, if any workers of that time could, in their
wildest imaginings, have predicted what was to come. In just 20 years from that auspicious
beginning most highly effective national control programs would begin grinding to a halt.
Their malaria control expertise would be frittered away, their funding would be gone, the price
of DDT would be up and its availability down, and the international policies for malaria control
would be changed from disease prevention to case detection and treatment. The declining
population of malaria control workers would begin seeing the disease they had worked so
hard to control expanding back into malaria-free areas. Malaria would once again be inflicting
ever-greater harm on the people they had tried to help. We should pause and consider how
that happened, how our community failed to recognize the threat, and why it failed to respond.
The answers to these questions are perhaps more simple than one might think. During the
1960s, and into the 1970s, our community was committed, and had its nose to the grindstone,
so to speak. From the initial use of DDT in the mid-1940s, our community had been in a position
to observe any adverse effects from insecticides, if they were to occur. The community had
close and continuous contact with the populations living in sprayed houses, and they saw no
meaningful adverse effects. In brief, it had no evidence of any problems that appeared
suddenly or gradually with the public health use of insecticides. Simultaneously the com‐
munity saw great improvements in health when DDT was used to prevent the diseases it
sought to eliminate. It was, perhaps, beyond the community’s ability to think that anyone
would work against a worthy and effective public health program; but the community was
wrong. Additionally, the community had not focused on diverging malaria control interests
of developed and developing countries. Divergences occurred because the developed coun‐
tries had used DDT to eliminate malaria and no longer needed it. Meanwhile the developing
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countries still needed DDT to help with their disease control problems. Last but not least, the
community had no prior experience with the ruthless and scientifically indefensible fear tactics
that were being unleashed against its disease control programs.
Threats to the old malaria eradication effort evolved from two ideologies within the environ‐
mental movement. One was that there are too many people on planet earth and malaria
elimination allowed excessive population growth of poor people in developing countries. The
second theme was that man-made chemicals endangered wildlife and human health. In 1970,
George Woodwell, a prominent and entrenched anti-insecticide campaigner, captured the two
ideologies in a paper he published in Science magazine. He concluded that the answer to the
problem of environmental pollution was “Fewer people, unpopular but increasing restrictions
on technology (making it more and more expensive) [9].” His concluding comment captured
the thinking of major stakeholders within the environmental movement at that time. Through
the careful use of fear tactics, global campaigns grew up around each ideology. Eventually the
ideologies became established at the highest levels of the UN and national governments of
developed countries. Those campaigns eventually destroyed effective disease control pro‐
grams. The campaigns against PHIs achieved success through misrepresentations of science,
by dragging companies and public organizations into courts in order to grab headlines for
their fear-invoking claims, by using smear tactics against those who spoke in defense of
insecticides, and, lastly, through extremely well-funded anti-insecticide advocacy. Through it
all, anti-insecticide campaigners were supported by a popular press that fed off the fear
invoked by the movement’s predictions of insecticides causing catastrophic harm to wildlife
and human health.
Naysayers will claim this is an exaggeration and that the old disease eradication programs
were eliminated for a slew of reasons not mentioned here. Indeed there were other factors; but
the overwhelming factors, as documented in annual proceedings of the WHO's Executive
Board, discussions of the World Health Assembly (WHA), internal documents of UNICEF,
and other published and unpublished reports, were those delineated above. Those who choose
to believe current programs are not at risk of a similar fate may venture the opinion that
regardless of past events, circumstances are entirely different now. They might even conclude
movements that brought down the old programs are no longer active. For certain, the people,
the claims, and the organizations have changed; but the themes and the scare tactics are the
same. Nevertheless we will concede one point. The circumstances facing disease control
programs today are entirely different from those that confronted the old disease eradication
programs. Chief among the differences are that the old programs were not confronted by:
• Global networks of well-funded anti-insecticide advocacy,
• A WHO that, aside from its support for DDT under Dr. Kochi’s brief leadership of the Global
Malaria Program, frequently prioritizes the agenda of environmentalist groups over public
health interests,
• Educational systems seeded with anti-insecticide propaganda,
• A Conference of the Parties to the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants
that has independent authority to select insecticides for global elimination,
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• Large national and international bureaucracies for regulatory control of insecticides,
• A vast, and largely anti-insecticide, research establishment functioning in universities and
research institutes around the world,
• Billions of dollars for regulatory control and research against insecticides,
• A declining arsenal of insecticides for malaria control, and
• Regulatory controls that are major impediments to the research and development of new
PHIs.
4. Environmentalism over public health policies
With an annual caseload estimated at 216 million and 655,000 deaths, malaria continues as one
of the most important insect-borne diseases [10]. Yet, it is just one of many insect-borne diseases
that collectively claim millions of lives and stifle economic growth and development in disease
endemic countries. PHIs and other public health chemicals are vital to the global struggle to
control these diseases. Where PHIs are removed or their use restricted, disease rates increase.
For example, two large eradication programs that were based almost entirely on public health
use of DDT, freed Bolivia of malaria, dengue fever, and risk of urban yellow fever from the
1950s to the mid-1970s. The WHO acknowledges the importance of one program as follows:
“Historically, mosquito control campaigns [that employed DDT] successfully eliminated Aedes
aegypti, the urban yellow fever vector, from most mainland countries of central and South
America. However, this mosquito species has re-colonized urban areas [with cessation of the
Aedes aegypti eradication program] in the region and poses a renewed risk of urban yellow
fever [11].” In spite of marvelous improvements in human health that were achieved by use
of PHIs, international anti-insecticide pressures were brought to bear on those programs.
Bolivia abandoned Aedes aegypti eradication in the 1970s. This occurred because Bolivia, as
with many countries of the Americas, ramped down eradication efforts once the US buckled
to anti-DDT pressures in 1969 and ended use of DDT for Aedes aegypti eradication. Almost all
countries of the Americas followed the US example in the 1970s. Years later Bolivia abandoned
use of DDT for malaria control. As a consequence, malaria and threats of urban yellow fever
are once again commonplace in Bolivia [12], and in 2009 Bolivia was savaged by a major dengue
epidemic.
India is another case study. In the early 1950s, India had an estimated 75 million malaria
infections, with roughly 800,000 deaths each year. Spraying DDT brought numbers of cases
down to 49,151 by 1961. Today, the number of malaria cases each year is in doubt. What seems
certain however is that the number of cases is huge and the number of deaths is on an order
of hundreds of thousands. Estimates for cases vary from a few million to tens of millions of
cases per year [13].
Despite the considerable human and economic toll caused by past increases in diseases like
malaria and dengue, the current arsenal of PHIs for spraying on house walls is limited to just
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12 compounds from four chemical classes, namely pyrethroids, organophosphates, carba‐
mates and organochlorines. Most PHIs are pyrethroids. DDT, the only organochlorine
permitted for use, is one of the 12 approved compounds.
Even though production and use of DDT has declined continuously during the last four
decades, DDT has grown as a convenient target of environmental science research. A recent
PubMed search (in early 2011) for research papers on insecticides uncovered almost 60,000
papers, and about one sixth (9,459) were on DDT. These are remarkable statistics considering
that DDT is hardly in use anymore. The decline in usage was sudden and corresponds to
precipitous drops in human body burdens of DDT residues. Today, for example, the amount
of DDT in human breast milk, based on serial surveys in many countries, is an infinitesimal
fraction of what it was in the 1960s—and even those exceedingly low levels are declining [14].
Along with precipitous reductions in DDT use, one could reasonably expect that research on
DDT would decline. However, as revealed in Figure 1, the numbers of published papers on
DDT have actually increased, and more so in recent years than in the past. Furthermore, papers
on DDT and malaria account for only a minor proportion (2.6 to 14.8% per year) of those
published papers. So, why is the research effort on DDT increasing even as the use of DDT
fades to inconsequential levels? To answer this question we will delve more into the modern
themes of environmental research and anti-insecticide advocacy.
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Figure 1. Average number of papers published per year on DDT or DDE. Data based on PubMed searches on key
words--DDT and/or DDE. Counts summed for five-year intervals of 1987-1991, 1997-2001, and 2007-2011.
5. Why increased research on insecticides?
A 2005 paper by Dr. Stephen Safe, a Distinguished Professor and recipient of the Distinguished
Lifetime Toxicology Scholar Award from the Society of Toxicology, explains much about the
modern trend of increased funding and research on DDT [15]. Professor Safe is a professor at
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Texas A&M and is a specialist in toxicology and molecular biology of estrogenic and anti-
estrogenic compounds. To summarize introductory comments in his 2005 paper, modern
emphasis on DDT is linked to a series of 1990 papers and the concept of the precautionary
principle. The papers proposed that endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs), which include
both man-made (synthetic) and naturally occurring chemicals, were contributing to diverse
health problems worldwide. The diverse harms include decreased male sperm counts,
increased birth defects, decreased fertility, increased incidence of breast and testicular cancers,
etc. As Dr. Safe states, the role of synthetic EDCs as a cause of diverse health problems has
been subjected to multiple challenges, to include a lack of biological plausibility for some
responses and failure to consider that people are more heavily exposed to natural or dietary
EDCs compared to relatively low exposures to the synthetic EDCs. Additionally, the natural
compounds are often far more potent endocrine disruptors than synthetic EDCs.
The 1990s papers and the concept of the precautionary principle resulted in new funding and
renewed interests in insecticides. As described by Dr. Safe, “Regulatory and research funding
agencies have taken the endocrine disruptor hypothesis seriously [15].” Funds for research
grew and, as a result, “... numerous laboratory animal and clinical studies have been initiated
to test the validity of the hypothesis and to determine the association between health problems
and exposure to EDCs [15].” This, in large part, seems to explain the huge growth in research
and numbers of publications about potential harms from DDT and other insecticides. It is
worth noting that extremely sensitive assays are available for DDT and other synthetic EDCs;
but assays are often not available for more abundant and more diverse populations of natural
EDCs. Thus it seems that the selection of DDT as a research topic is more closely related to
availability and familiarity with quantitative assays opposed to some understanding of what
the real threats are from synthetic versus natural EDCs.
In his 2005 paper Dr. Safe reviews many recent studies, and we refer the reader to his paper
for more in-depth analyses. He comments on the synthetic EDCs as casual agents in breast
cancer and male reproductive track anomalies. For the former, he reviews several studies, to
include a meta-analysis, and concludes that the evidence does not support the hypothesis that
DDE causes breast cancer. He concludes further that “If organochlorines do not significantly
impact on this disease [breast cancer], it is now time to generate new hypotheses and focus on
identifying other etiological factors that are linked to the high incidence of sporadic breast
cancer in women [15].”
Dr. Safe reviewed numerous studies on DDT and other synthetic organochlorines (OCs)
reportedly causing diseases of the male reproductive tract. The claim that sperm counts are
declining is central to the thesis of many alarmists who propose that synthetic OCs are causing
declining male sexual function. Dr. Safe reviews past reports and concludes, “results from
various clinics are not sufficient to support a global decrease or increase [15]” in sperm counts.
He also concludes “the hypothesized role of in utero exposure to estrogens as a factor in
regulating sperm count in adult males is also questionable [15].” Dr. Safe goes on to review
studies on possible associations between levels of synthetic EDCs with urogenital birth defects
and increasing trends of testicular cancer. For the former, he found that both the evidence of
increasing rate of birth defects and the hypothetical associations between those rates and
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exposures to synthetic EDCs were not persuasive. Additionally, evidence of multiple studies
did not support the hypothesis that synthetic EDCs were a cause of testicular cancer.
In this brief section we have described the major themes of research that will be the source of
future claims against PHIs. Dr. Safe sounded a warning in his comments about EDCs and
breast cancer. He pointed out that our abilities to detect EDCs and a wealth of other variables
(for example, biomarkers, genotypes, and a wealth of other biological, biochemical, environ‐
mental, and sociological variables) “increases the probability of ‘chance’ correlations, and there
are several examples of these associations that are not consistent across all studies [15].” So, it
seems clear that we should expect a greater frequency of claims against PHIs in the future.
That said, anti-insecticide advocacy more so than research poses the greatest threat to the
future of effective disease control programs. As we observed in the negotiations for the
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) described below, well-funded
anti-insecticide advocacy is the operational arm of the environmental movement. But unlike
the careful deliberations of most environmental scientists, anti-insecticide groups are not
constrained by subtle considerations of consistent and meaningful evidence and other criteria
for cause-effect relationships, or by considerations of harm versus benefits of insecticide use.
6. Renewed malaria control programs beset by opposition to PHIs
As stated in an earlier section, today there is great enthusiasm and considerable funding to
advance the goals of global control of malaria. We arrive at this period of enthusiasm only
because we lived through many years of almost no hope at all.
The steady increase in malaria cases that led to RBM’s formation had several underlying
causes. Among them was the spread of drug resistance around the world. Since the 1940s
chloroquine had been a mainstay of malaria treatment programs, but resistance by the
Plasmodium falciparum parasite to the drug first appeared in the 1950s and slowly spread
worldwide. Chloroquine was duly replaced by sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) in the 1980s,
but resistance soon emerged to this drug as well.
Another cause of the growing burden of malaria was the lack of interest in malaria control by
major donor agencies and malarial country governments. Enthusiasm for malaria dissipated
when the great push against malaria - the global malaria eradication campaign of the 1950s
and 60s – was called off. Malaria control is expensive, requiring the employment of trained
personnel, logistics specialists, scientists and large quantities of drugs and vector control
products. Continuing to pay for malaria control year in and year out when it was clear that
global eradication was not feasible was a tough sell. Concurrently the focus for many devel‐
opment agencies was away from disease control and towards population control, as we touch
on in this chapter and explain in more detail in The Excellent Powder, DDT’s Political and Scientific
History [16]. Few newly independent and highly malarial African countries sustained malaria
control programs that had been run by colonial rulers. In Zambia, for instance, malaria control
programs that had been set up when the country was ruled by Great Britain as Northern
Rhodesia collapsed along with the Zambian economy in the 1980s.
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However, as illustrated in the examples of disease control history in Bolivia and India, arguably
one of the greatest obstacles to sustained malaria control was the growing campaign against
PHIs, and DDT in particular. DDT had been used in malaria control since World War II. The
effectiveness of this insecticide in controlling malaria was unprecedented. As we explain
above, DDT, when sprayed on the inside walls of houses, acts to repel mosquitoes, but it will
also irritate mosquitoes so they exit houses sooner than they otherwise would and will kill
mosquitoes that rest on a sprayed surface long enough.
Through these multiple modes of action, and thanks to the dedicated work of thousands of
hard working malaria control program officers, DDT saved around one billion people from
malaria during the eradication era. But what some people heralded as a great savior, others
decried as a harbinger of doom. Chief among the anti-DDT crusaders was Rachel Carson whose
1962 book, Silent Spring, is a florid and grossly exaggerated attack on the chemical for its
supposed impact on wildlife and human health [17]. There were, and are, no shortages of
Carson acolytes who have joined in with their own attacks on DDT, as we explain later in this
chapter.
Following the banning of DDT for most uses in the US and Western Europe in the 1970s,
production fell dramatically. Although DDT was still permitted for use in disease control,
supplies dwindled and predictably the cost began to rise. It mattered little that the WHO’s
malaria control advisers still supported the use of DDT, when the reality was that fewer
countries could obtain it. In 1969, Scandinavian countries, Canada and the US started to place
'severe' restrictions on the use of DDT [18]. Thus, it was no coincidence that global malaria
eradication and the United State’s Aedes aegypti eradication programs were both stopped in
1969—just as it was no coincidence that both relied on use of DDT [16]. Unsurprisingly, within
just a few years, malarial countries were complaining to the WHO of their inability to obtain
the chemical and use it to save lives [19]. Along with the growing campaigns against DDT,
donor agencies like USAID, under pressure of legal actions, began to withdraw funding for
DDT and malaria control in the 1970s.
In the following section we will detail, with a specific example, how the bio-politics of
environmental activism against DDT and other PHIs translated into real world harm to human
health. For this example we have chosen a country that has a strong tradition in science and a
long and proud history of combating malaria.
7. Public health insecticides and malaria
The value of PHIs in controlling malaria is best evidenced by historical data on DDT sprayed
houses. Brazil, as with other countries with territory within the Amazon Basin, struggles with
difficult malaria control issues. The Amazon Basin is the most enduring environment in the
Americas for the persistence of endemic malaria. Populated with many rural, poorly housed
and mobile inhabitants, the Amazon Basin covers a vast geographical area of warm, humid
environments. More importantly, it is populated with the Hemisphere’s most dangerous
vector of human malaria, Anopheles darlingi. In the absence of this species or in regions of the
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Americas where it is less common, the chain of malaria transmission is weaker and more easily
interrupted. For this reason, malaria often declines to low levels in the face of organized control
programs in regions outside the Amazon Basin. In contrast, within the Amazon Basin, malaria
exhibited some refractoriness to control measures even during years of the global malaria
eradication program. As a consequence, eradication was not achieved. Nevertheless the
spraying of DDT on house walls greatly reduced malaria infections and lifted a large part of
the burden of malaria from the backs of people in the Amazon Basin.
Successful malaria control by spraying DDT was maintained for many years. Yet, the succes‐
sion of bio-political events described in the previous section and elsewhere eventually
destroyed Brazil’s well-orchestrated malaria control program. Malaria cases began to increase
when the numbers of houses being sprayed were progressively reduced in the 1980s. The many
years of successful control followed by years when the spray program withered away are
detailed in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Number of houses sprayed per 1000 population versus the annual parasite index (cases per 1000 popula‐
tion) in Brazil during the years 1962 to 1993. Data for these years were collected under uniform data collection meth‐
ods (see Roberts et al. 1997. for data sources [34]).
The graph presents annual parasite indices (APIs) and house spray rates (HSRs) from 1962 to
1993. Two clusters of data points are identified. One group represents the years from 1962 to
1981 when house spray rates were high and malaria indices were low. The API is a standard
malaria control index, calculated as the annual number of diagnosed malaria cases X 1000/
population size. The HSR represents the number of houses sprayed per 1000 population. As
shown in this graph, APIs in years after 1981 increased in response to reductions in numbers
of houses being sprayed.
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To bring Brazil’s story up to date, Figure 3 presents statistics on malaria cases through 2010. As
described in the previous section, there has been a global renewal in efforts to control malaria.
Thus, in recent years, Brazil expanded its malaria control efforts. But even with increased
financial support and availability of new malaria control technologies (e.g., case treatment with
the new and effective ACTs, insecticide treated nets and so-called long-lasting nets),  the
accomplishments of recent years are less than what is needed and certainly far less than what
was achieved and sustained during 20 years of spraying houses with DDT. As demonstrated in
Figure 3, there was an average of 100,000 cases per year during those 20 years of major reli‐
ance on DDT. As DDT use declined in the 1980s, the average number of cases/year increased to
450,000. In the next decade, DDT use was abandoned completely and cases increased to over
500,000 per year. Today, even with an expanded program of control, the average number of
cases per year is well over 400,000. The differences in results of the last 30 years over what was
achieved with DDT roughly sums to 10.5 million cases that might have been prevented if DDT
had not been abandoned. While population growth as an independent variable might account
for some growth in numbers of cases, the increased number of cases corresponds, over time, to
changes in slide positivity rates. The slide positivity rate is neutral in terms of population size.
As a reminder, the estimate of 10.5 million excess malaria cases is for Brazil alone.
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Figure 3. Average number of cases per year in Brazil  across defined blocks of years (x-axis).  Data for these years
were collected under uniform data collection methods (see Roberts  et  al.  1997 for  data sources  [34]  and PAHO
malaria data [57]).
Clearly the great reductions of malaria from 1962 to 1981 compared to later blocks of years
reveals the enormous benefit of DDT and other insecticides.
One of the most compelling examples of the usefulness of DDT in malaria control comes from
recent experience in South Africa. This country had successfully used DDT in malaria control
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since the late 1940s and in so doing had dramatically reduced the malarial areas to the regions
bordering Mozambique to the east and Zimbabwe to the north. In 1996 South Africa’s Malaria
Advisory Group (MAG) advised the national malaria control program to begin phasing out
DDT. This advice was based on two main factors. First, DDT is best applied to the mud and
dung walls of traditional African houses rather than on the plastered and painted walls of
western style houses where the DDT can stain the walls. Given the staining, homeowners were
often reluctant to allow the spray teams to enter their houses. As the rural areas of South Africa
have developed and become wealthier, more and more people have built western style houses,
requiring alternative insecticides. Second, the MAG had taken note of the political pressure
against the use of DDT and anticipating greater restrictions on the use of DDT, decided to
transition over to other chemicals. In the late 1990s therefore the provincial malaria programs
began replacing DDT with pyrethroids. The first province to do so was KwaZulu Natal, which
borders Mozambique and at the time was the most malarial of the countries three malarial
provinces [16].
Almost as soon as the KwaZulu Natal malaria control program changed over to pyrethroids,
malaria cases started to rise. By 2000, malaria cases had increased five fold from just over 8,500
cases to almost 42,000 cases. Malaria deaths increased from just 22 in 1996 to 320 in 2000 as
malaria patients overwhelmed clinics and hospitals [20].
Research showed that a major driver of the epidemic was resistance to pyrethroid insecticides.
In addition, evidence was rising that malaria parasite resistance had grown to SP, or Fansidar.
The Department of Health took the decision to reintroduce DDT and change treatment regimen
from Fansidar to the newly-available ACT, artemether-lumefantrine, or Coartem. Within a
year malaria cases plummeted by around 80 percent [21]. The combination of a proven and
effective PHI along with effective treatment reduced malaria transmission so dramatically that
within just a few years, malaria elimination was within sight.
Given the benefit and usefulness of DDT and other PHIs in the control of malaria, as described
above, how is it possible that PHIs have been so effectively demonized? In the next section we
will describe strategies and tactics that have been employed to paralyze malaria control
programs in countries around the world. As an aside, it is worth noting that those who
ruthlessly campaign against DDT and other PHIs shamelessly deny any responsibility
whatsoever for the increasing burdens of disease that inevitably occur when their campaigns
succeed.
8. Goals, strategies, and tactics of anti-insecticide campaigns
The goal for environmental campaigns is to reduce or eliminate use of PHIs for the presumed
but ambiguous purpose of better environmental health. Another goal, at least for some,
appears to be stopping the use of chemicals that protect health and save lives in order to slow
growth of human populations.
In the 1960s, the goal of halting or reducing the use of man-made insecticides was laid out in
Rachel Carson’s unscientific writings in Silent Spring. In 1968, the Malthusian rantings of Paul
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Ehrlich in The Population Bomb focused attention on the contributions of DDT to growth of
human populations in malaria-endemic countries. The goal of reducing human populations
was never silenced; and it is once again a topic of heated debate, with some claiming billions
of people must be eliminated [22].
The goal of today’s anti-insecticide activists is still to reduce or eliminate synthetic insecticides.
Achieving such a goal requires strategies and tactics. There are three visible strategies for
achieving the goal of reducing or eliminating PHIs. The first is to convince people that PHIs
are harmful. The second is to claim the chemicals are not needed in order to control diseases.
The third strategy is to predict that grave harm will occur if the PHIs continue to be used. In
this section we will give background information and three examples of the first strategy. In
most cases we will focus on issues of DDT, but the same strategies and tactics are employed
against other PHIs.
In a historical context, anti-insecticide advocates used propaganda and emotional arguments
to convince people insecticides were dangerous and their use should be stopped. They were
helped by science writers of the popular press and their efforts led to public health programs
being abandoned around the world – and a resurgence of malaria infections. We have already
presented one example of such an outcome (see Figures 2 and 3).
Anti-insecticide activism is an even stronger force today, and anti-insecticide advocates are
even more determined to deny developing countries the protections from disease and death
that only insecticides can provide. Because of environmental and anti-insecticide advocacy,
the WHA adopted a resolution (WHA 50.13) in May 1997 that calls on countries to reduce
reliance on use of insecticides for disease control [23]. Then, in 1998, the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) began negotiations for a POPs treaty targeting DDT and 11
other chemicals for global elimination [24]. The beginning of those negotiations stimulated
malaria scientists and other public health professionals to mount a global campaign to defend
the use of DDT in disease control programs. The public health campaign was successful and
DDT was listed on Annex B of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,
which allowed its continued use. Yet, and despite the public health campaign’s success, anti-
DDT and anti-insecticide advocacy is unabated in UNEP, the US Environmental Protection
Agency, the European Union, and, to lesser extent, in public agencies financing disease control
programs. As a result, DDT factories closed their doors. Today, only one in India is still in
operation. Also, environmental campaigners have erected formidable international barriers to
the purchase and supply of DDT. Countries are under continual pressure from anti-DDT
advocacy groups, and they are being enticed by financial mechanisms of Global Environment
Facility (GEF) to stop using DDT.
WHA resolution 50.13 and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,
described above, are only the most recent in 50 years of efforts to eliminate DDT and other
PHIs. Success in anti-PHI campaigns has been achieved by scaring people with false claims.
Anti-DDT propaganda typically claims DDT causes all manner of harm to human health.
Readily embraced and trumpeted by the popular press, the claims, in reality, never satisfy
even the most minimal cause-effect criteria [25]. These internationally accepted criteria are:
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• Strength of the association. The stronger an observed association appears over a series of
different studies, the less likely this association is spurious because of bias.
• Dose-response effect. The value of the response variable changes in a meaningful way with
the dose (or level) of the suspected causal agent.
• Lack of temporal ambiguity. The hypothesized cause precedes the occurrence of the effect.
• Consistency of the findings. Most, or all, studies concerned with a given causal hypothesis
produce similar findings.
• Biological or theoretical plausibility. The hypothesized causal relationship is consistent with
current biological or theoretical knowledge.
• Coherence of the evidence. The findings do not seriously conflict with accepted facts about
the outcome variable being studied.
• Specificity of the association. The observed effect is associated with only the suspected cause
(or few other causes that can be ruled out).
In the case of a true cause-effect relationship we can reasonably expect measurable levels of
harm as a result of human exposures. Levels of harm will be proportional to harmfulness of
the agent and to durations and characteristics of exposures. The more harmful an agent, the
more likely it is to produce obvious levels of harm. Harm from weaker agents, on the other
hand, will probably not be obvious and be definable only through population-based statistics.
Regardless, ending use of a weak, but truly harmful, agent will reduce exposure to the
chemical, reduce chemical concentration in the environment, and reduce the levels of harm.
This is true even if the chemical is characterized as persistent, as is DDT. Persistence does not
mean the chemical does not degrade. It just means that in certain compartments of the
environment or living organisms it will degrade or be eliminated more slowly. Levels of DDT
in the environment generally decline rapidly after its use is stopped. It is precisely because
DDT does degrade that house walls are re-sprayed once or twice a year in order to achieve
effective levels of malaria control.
Here, with the example of cigarette smoke and cancer, we illustrate application of cause-effect
criteria. The link between smoking and human cancer has been validated through experimen‐
tation and vital statistics. In general, the argument that cigarette smoke caused cancer was
convincing because patterns of low or high cancer rates consistently correlated with patterns
of low or high smoking rates and duration of smoking. Furthermore, as people stopped
smoking their risk of cancer actually declined. Consistent and persuasive evidence of cause-
effect relationships between cigarette smoking and cancers formed the basis of public health
campaigns to reduce or stop cigarette smoking. Unlike those public health campaigns,
however, the environmental campaigns against PHIs are not based on persuasive and,
certainly not, consistent, scientific evidence. The occasional observational study that suggests
use of a public health insecticide harms health is countered by many other studies that suggest
otherwise. Nevertheless, and as illustrated below, environmental campaigners readily ignore
essential criteria for establishing a cause-effect relationship and greedily grab any new study
that suggests some association between PHIs and human disease. The activist community has
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shown itself to be highly adept at getting such studies widespread national and international
media coverage, often with headlines and messages designed to strike fear into people's hearts.
These headlines are also very useful in advancing careers and ensuring ongoing research
funding. We will describe three examples of how environmental advocates, and in some cases
the environmental scientists themselves, ignore the criteria for establishing cause-effect
relationships and use preliminary studies to push their anti-PHI agenda, or, more selfishly,
their personal research agenda. The three examples are illustrations of the first strategy to
convince people that DDT is a public health threat.
Example 1:
Mary Wolff and co-authors (1993) published a paper in which they claimed a statistical
association of DDE (a major DDT metabolite) with breast cancer [26]. DDT opponents then
used this paper to gain public attention and convince people that DDT caused breast cancer.
To be specific, we are talking about anti-insecticide activists, not Dr. Wolff. Years later, with
completion of many other studies, and without fanfare or wide publicity, researchers con‐
cluded DDE was not a cause of breast cancer. The WHO reassessment of DDT exposures from
indoor spray programs states, “Overall, the association between DDT and breast cancer is
inconclusive [27].” Regardless, for many years, anti-DDT activists heralded the 1993 paper as
final proof of DDT harm and used it to generate funds and recruit new members to campaigns
for DDT elimination [28].
Example 2:
Following a different thread of research, Rogan and coauthors reported that DDE was
associated with reduced duration of lactation [29,30]. As with the reported association of DDT
and breast cancer, this claim was grabbed by the WWF in 1998 and used in the propaganda
campaign leading up to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. The stated
goal of the WWF campaign was a phase out of DDT by 2007 [28]. In their coverage of this topic,
the WWF stated that studies “showed that the duration of lactation was inversely related to
the concentration of DDE in milk.” Separate from the WWF’s use of these claims, the claims
were, in part, also the basis for two high-profile publications by Rogan and coauthors in the
journals, Emerging Infectious Diseases [31] and The Lancet [32]. They proposed that the benefits
of spraying DDT on house walls to control malaria in Africa would be cancelled out by lowered
child survival due to reduced durations of lactation and potential increases in premature
births. The claims were used in campaigns against DDT and used to justify more research
support.
Once published, the claims became tools for anti-DDT advocacy. For example, the claim is part
of a 2005 Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) document about DDT and its use in Kenya.
The PSR author states, “DDT may have a substantial impact on infant mortality, by increasing
the risk of pre-term birth and by decreasing the duration of breast-feeding after birth. In this
paper, Chen and Rogan conclude that DDT may cause comparable increase in infant mortality
through these mechanisms compared to the decrease in infant mortality it causes by killing
mosquitoes and thus reducing malaria cases [33].”
Anopheles mosquitoes - New insights into malaria vectors650
Without doubt the papers had great value for the anti-DDT advocacy community, yet the
background studies for those claims did not fulfill the criteria for establishing DDT as the cause
of reduced lactation or of pre-term births. In fact, even Chen and Rogan [31] stated the reported
associations did not prove DDT caused any of the illnesses they discussed. Regardless, the
claims were used as if they proved, beyond any doubt, that DDT was the cause of harm. This
was illustrated in an exchange of letters to the Editor of the journal, Emerging Infectious
Diseases. The exchange was between Roberts [34,35] and the WWF (written by Matteson) [36].
Matteson stated in her letter, “DDT also is associated with reduced lactation, premature
births…” Naturally, Matteson used those reported associations to demonize DDT as part of
WWF’s push for global elimination of DDT by 2007. Misuse of those claims is further illustrated
by an article defending Rachel Carson by the Rachel Carson Council. As with the PSR author,
this writer used both claims plus the assertions included in the two papers by Rogan and
coauthors about the benefits of DDT being canceled out by increased deaths of newborns in
Africa. As stated in this very recent online article: “…significant shortening of the lactation
cycle-time that human mothers can produce milk for their babies linked to DDT exposure.
Based on reports for both premature births and reduced lactation cycles, scientists have
predicted that regular DDT exposure could increase the possibility of higher levels of infant
mortality for women in Africa who live in treated environments [37].”
There are many other examples of how these claims have been used and continue to be used
in anti-insecticide propaganda. As stated in a 2006 article advocating against the use of DDT
by the Pesticide Action Network in the UK, “Other studies have linked DDT to reduced
breastmilk production, premature delivery and reduced infant birthweights [sic] [38].” Last
but not least, Wikipedia includes the following statement:
Human epidemiological studies suggest that exposure is a risk factor for premature birth and
low birth weight, and may harm a mother's ability to breast feed. Some 21st-century research‐
ers argue that these effects may increase infant deaths, offsetting any anti-malarial benefits. A
2008 study, however, failed to confirm the association between exposure and difficulty
breastfeeding [39].
Mention of the 2008 study is perhaps helpful; but it is not sufficient. Given that DDT produces
great benefit in control of malaria, Wikipedia contributors should be careful in comments about
DDT lest their written assessments inflict grave harm on poor people in malaria endemic
countries. Point of fact, the Wikipedia assessment leaves the reader thinking that DDT causes
premature births and reduced duration of lactation, when the weight of scientific evidence
shows it does not.
Example 3:
Unfortunately, the false claims against DDT are unabated. One of the more recent and truly
tragic examples of a false public image for PHIs occurred in 2009 when researchers in South
Africa reported DDT was associated with urogenital birth defects in boys in a region where
houses are sprayed with DDT to control malaria [40]. Although the authors, led by Prof. Riana
Bornman of the University of Pretoria, suggest that DDT may not have caused the birth defects,
the authors still state people should be informed about risks of birth defects if DDT is used.
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Their interpretations and claims were aired broadly in the print and electronic media in South
Africa. The public’s concern over the researcher’s claims created difficulties for the malaria
control program. DDT, through decades of use in South Africa, had already proven its disease
preventing capabilities. Given its proven record of performance, it is hardly reasonable to
alarm people unless DDT is proven to be seriously harmful. In this case, the weaknesses of the
researcher’s claims had been addressed in the journal where the paper was published. Richard
Grady addressed this issue in the editorial comment that accompanied the Bornman et al. paper
[40]. Grady stated that issues of association and causality could not be distinguished in the
paper. Grady was right; Bornman and coauthor’s claims that DDT caused birth defects did not
fulfill criteria for establishing a cause-effect relationship. As point of published fact, there were
no statistically significant differences in the proportions of malformed genitalia among boys
in sprayed and unsprayed villages. Given this fundamental failing, their pronouncements
should not have been published and certainly should not have been used to scare the public
away from having their houses sprayed. However, attempts in South Africa to scare people
about DDT continue even now.
One of the researchers behind the urogenital birth defects claims recently reported on the levels
of DDT in breast milk in sprayed villages in South Africa compared to results of an unsprayed
village [41]. During the 70+ years of DDT use, many studies of DDT in breast milk have been
performed. Based on those reports, it is expected that residents of DDT sprayed houses will
have higher quantities of DDT in breast milk than residents of unsprayed villages. It is expected
that intake by some infants will exceed the Provisional Tolerable Daily Intake (PTDI) and, in
some cases, the residue levels will exceed the Maximum Residue Limit (MRL). In order to
exaggerate the importance of their study, the authors emphasized the outlier measurements
beyond confidence limits of mean values, e.g., in the abstract they report their statistics include
“the highest ΣDDT level ever reported for breast milk from South Africa.” Their control village
was not sprayed and had no history of ever being sprayed. Yet the authors fail to mention that
mean values of residues were at or above the MRL in the unsprayed village. They fail to
mention that outlier data points in the control village, as with sprayed villages, exceeded the
PTDI. They fail to mention that confidence limits for measurements from the control village
overlap those of some sprayed villages. Authors emphasize gender differences in infants and
associated levels of DDT in breast milk even though the differences were not statistically
significant. They suggest the results require further research. Additionally, authors [41] report
that mean levels of DDT had no impact on duration of lactation.
In press coverage of this paper the headlines read, “Researchers measure highest DDT levels
in breast milk from South African nursing mothers [42].” In fact, outlier data points can result
from erroneous dilutions, tests, conversions, or other parts of the experimental process, or just
uncommon natural variation. For these reasons most researchers give outlier data points little
weight. Yet the authors of this study used an outlier data point as a hook for grabbing headlines
in the popular media. Media coverage went on to state, “In the region where the measurements
were carried out, malformed genitalia among boys was significantly more common in areas
treated with DDT compared with untreated areas.” The assertion that DDT affects male
urogenital development is mentioned in the paper, e.g., referring to the 2009 study they state,
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“Research…identified DDT-associated effects on male urogenital parameters…[41].” Howev‐
er, the statement is misleading because, as described above, there were no statistically
significant differences in the proportions of malformed genitalia among boys in sprayed and
unsprayed villages.
Presented in three examples above is clear and unambiguous demonstration of orchestrat‐
ed and non-scientific  campaigns against  PHIs,  and DDT in particular.  Claims that  DDT
causes one sort of harm or another are repeated in anti-insecticide propaganda even after
published studies show the claims are false, or published rebuttals draw attention to errors
in data analyses or research interpretations.  A common part  of  these campaigns is  how
activists  use  the  term  “association”  or  “associated”  as  meaning  there  is  a  cause-effect
relationship between an exposure and disease. In fact, these terms relate only to a statistical
association that is often an artifact of study design or a product of systematic bias. Such
issues as bias are of particular concern, and are discussed at length in David Savitz’s book
Interpreting epidemiologic evidence [43].
In the history of efforts to preserve use of DDT for public health programs, this chain of events
has been repeated over and over, with claims of causation eventually being disproven, but not
before they were used to generate funds, recruit new members to anti-insecticide campaigns,
and change public health policies. Last but not least, each change in disease control policy has
weakened global capacities to control malaria and other diseases. Almost every change is a
result of anti-insecticide propaganda that misrepresents the scientific process, as revealed for
the three examples described above:
• The breast cancer example reveals a general trend of anti-DDT campaigners railing against
DDT while failing to meet minimal evidentiary standards for proof of cause-effect relation‐
ships (as defined by the principles of causation [25]). In brief, those who campaign against
DDT have failed to show, through replicated and confirmatory studies, that a specific type
of public health harm from DDT was a consistent finding across studies, and that it was
consistent with current biological or theoretical knowledge of the type of harm and its
known risk factors; for example:
◦ More common with higher DDT exposure and less common with lower exposure,
◦ Less common prior to DDT exposure and appeared or increased in frequency with onset
of DDT exposure, and
◦ More common with DDT exposure and less common once DDT use was stopped.
• The example of DDT as a reputed cause of reduced duration of lactation illustrates how an
unproven claim can be used in scientific literature to assert that an unintended consequence
of DDT might cause as much harm as benefit. Also it shows how the claim can continue to
appear in anti-insecticide propaganda long after it is disproven.
• The example of malformed male genitalia illustrates how false associations can be used in
attempts to scare people away from allowing their houses to be sprayed. Also the example
illustrates how tangential studies (a survey of DDT in breast milk) can be used to exaggerate
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dangers of DDT and to cast further attention on the results of weak studies. Sadly, the two
studies are being used to scare people who live in malarious regions.
9. Dichotomies in patterns/trends of human disease with/without DDT
Decades ago, developed countries used extraordinary quantities of DDT. The richer countries
placed DDT in the human food chain through its heavy agricultural use at that time. More
explicitly, DDT was used in the environment, around houses, and intensively inside homes.
It is now 40 years since being banned for most uses in the US and other developed countries.
Yet, recent claims of DDT causing disease or birth defects are not reflected in the historical
medical reports and vital statistics for regions and years of broad and heavy DDT usage. The
lack of proof that DDT caused harm to human health back in the days of intense exposures
goes far in explaining why, to this day, there is no evidence that human health has been
improved in any way by stopping public health uses of DDT.
There is a dichotomy in the huge benefit from use of DDT to prevent diseases and deaths versus
no definable benefit from stopping its use. For slightly more than three decades (1945-1979)
many malaria endemic countries maintained house spray programs. That era was followed
by decades, from 1979 through to present time, when most of the same countries phased house
spraying out of national programs. The result is a historical record of years when DDT and
other insecticides were sprayed in houses followed by almost as many years when spraying
was greatly decreased or stopped entirely. An even more drastic stoppage of DDT spraying
occurred in agriculture. The dichotomies of outcomes are listed in Table 1.
Benefits versus harms of public
health insecticides
1946-79 (period of DDT spraying
in houses)
1980-present (period when DDT
spraying was reduced or stopped)
Harm from insecticide exposures Increases in poisonings and deaths
from insecticide exposures in houses
Reductions in poisonings and
deaths as house spraying is
eliminated
Benefits from using insecticides to
control malaria and other diseases
Reductions in malaria infections and
deaths as a consequence of DDT on
house walls
Increases in malaria infections and
deaths as house spraying of DDT is
eliminated
Table 1. Grid of cause-effect relationships for public health outcomes during periods of use and non-use of DDT in
public health programs.
As explained for smoking and human cancers, the relationship of declining risk with reduced
exposure attests to a true and meaningful causal relationship. An inverse finding of increasing
risk with increasing exposure to a causative agent also attests to a true and meaningful causal
relationship. These indicators of causation make it all the more amazing that through decades
of anti-insecticide advocacy, insecticide opponents have documented no obvious public health
harm as a result of DDT residues on house walls. Likewise, they have documented no
meaningful improvements in health or reduced deaths as a direct result of having eliminated
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DDT exposure by ending house spray programs. These failings suggest DDT opponents have
not been challenged to balance an equation of measurable benefits from preventing the use of
DDT and other public health insecticides versus the measurable increases in human deaths
and diseases, like malaria, as consequence of stopping use of public health insecticides.
10. Models for modern advocacy against PHIs
Now, on the fiftieth anniversary of Silent Spring, the goal of reducing or eliminating DDT
and  other  PHIs  is,  and  has  been  for  decades,  entrenched  in  environmental  advocacy
literature  and  in  bureaucracies  of  the  UN.  In  the  case  of  DDT,  this  goal  was  clearly
enunciated by UNEP in 2000:
WHO and UNEP have joined forces to protect both human health and the environment by promoting strategies to reduce malaria
with reduced reliance on DDT. An important first step was taken in March 2000 through a WHO-convened Regional Consultation
to Prepare African Countries Towards Reduction of Reliance on DDT for Malaria Control, with UNEP support. [44]
For UNEP bureaucrats, the statement codifies the environmentalist’s belief that small quanti‐
ties of DDT sprayed on house walls harms the environment. Also it codifies the belief that DDT
is not needed in malaria control programs. In both cases, the bureaucrats are wrong.
Information presented in Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the enormous danger of forcing countries
to abandon DDT and other PHIs. Since the early 1980s over 10.5 million preventable malaria
cases were recorded above and beyond what might have occurred if Brazil had not abandoned
DDT. There were no DDT resistance issues that caused malaria program managers to abandon
DDT, there were no important studies showing DDT repellent properties did not work, there
were no malaria trend analyses showing a lack of efficacious control with DDT sprayed walls,
and there were no cost-effective insecticides that could be used instead. DDT was abandoned
in Brazil and in other countries of South America as a consequence of global environmental
policies and anti-insecticide campaigns. DDT was not eliminated from Peru’s malaria program
until the late 1980s. Peru’s malaria problems grew exponentially worse immediately after the
country dispensed with DDT spraying. These disastrous outcomes were repeated in many
countries.
With the beginning of the 21st Century and infused with renewed support and improved
targeting in application of control efforts, malaria control programs are beginning to make
some progress. But further progress is needed and malaria continues as a huge public health
problem. Meanwhile, as in the 1960s, insecticide opponents are poised to counter the recent
progress against malaria. We will now focus on specific tactics that are and will continue to be
used in the anti-insecticide campaigns.
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As we have described, the first strategy of insecticide opposition is to convince people that
DDT or other PHIs are harmful. An important tactic for achieving success is to develop and
broadcast widely and repeatedly a list of diverse claims of chemical harm. We have already
described examples of how this tactic is implemented. A list of diverse sources of harm is not
easy to counter. When an authoritative rebuttal of one claim occurs, the other claims are still
in play. Additionally, a broad list of claims allows campaigners to tailor platforms for constit‐
uencies, advancing one set of claims with one constituency and a different combination for
another. Another tactic is to focus on the most recent study hinting at some health impact of
the chemical. It is easier to get the popular media interested in a study that can be presented
as a new and sensational finding--a favorite theme of science writers. Regardless, a list of
multiple claims of harm is hardly sufficient to achieve a ban of a truly useful PHI. Thus, the
second strategy of convincing people the chemical is not needed becomes extraordinarily
important. The tactic behind this goal is to argue that alternative chemicals or methods can be
used as replacements. We will present two examples of tactics employed in support of this
strategy. The third strategy is to predict that grave harm will occur if the chemical continues
to be used.
The success of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring serves as a model for the three strategies. In Silent
Spring, Rachel Carson used the strategies on her primary target, DDT. She described a very
large list of potential adverse effects of insecticides, including human health and ecological
effects. She argued that insecticides were not really needed because their use selected for super
bugs that were resistant to the insecticides and that the chemicals only made problems worse.
Last but not least, she described scary scenarios of severe harm with continued use of DDT
and other insecticides.
Carson focused attention on examples of overuse or misuse of DDT and other insecticides and
described the effects of their misuse. Nevertheless, the misuse of chemicals is not a valid reason
for banning an insecticide. In the case of DDT, a successful campaign to eliminate it requires
that even its proper use will cause a large and systematic adverse effect. However, the proper
public health uses of DDT yield no large and systematic adverse effects. Absent such adverse
actions, the activists must then rely on claims about insidious effects, particularly insidious
effects that scientists will find difficult to prove one way or the other, and that activists can use
to predict a future catastrophe.
Rachel Carson relied heavily on possible insidious chemical actions as a means of alarming
and scaring the public. Many of those who joined the resulting campaign to ban DDT and other
insecticides made extensive use of claims of insidious effects. In particular Carson alluded to
insidious effects on reproduction. Her assertions were amplified by the popular press and
became part of the public perception about insecticides. Although those perceptions are wrong,
they are firmly entrenched in anti-insecticide propaganda.
The three strategies, while largely bogus in terms of their scientific underpinnings, were very
effective in anti-insecticide campaigns. The strategies are still used today. Rogan and Chen
used these strategies in their two papers against DDT [31,32]. The authors presented strategy
number two in the form of a superficial review of the role of DDT in malaria control. They
strove to cast doubt on DDT's value in modern malaria control programs. They admitted that
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DDT had been very effective in the past, but then argued that malaria control programs no
longer needed it and alternative methods of control should be used. Rogan and Chen also
employed the first strategy of environmentalism [32]. Their list of potential harms from DDT
exposures included toxic effects, neurobehavioral effects, cancers, decrements in various facets
of reproductive health, decrements in infant and child development, and immunology and
DNA damage. To get the paper past reviewers they presented balanced coverage of their
diverse claims of harm, and, as consequence, had to conclude they could not prove that DDT
caused any harm at all. Amazingly, they promptly negated this honest conclusion by asserting
that if DDT is used for malaria control then great harm might occur. So, while not proving
DDT causes harm, the authors still predict severe harm if it is used.
Rogan and Chen end their paper with a call for more research. One could conclude that the
intent of the whole paper is merely to lobby for research dollars to better define DDT harm,
and what’s the harm in that? Surely increasing knowledge is a fine goal. However, having
engaged issues of malaria control and what should or should not be done to control the disease,
specifying more research funds for research on potential harms of insecticide exposures is
unjustified. Large numbers of children and pregnant women die from malaria every year, and
the disease sickens hundreds of millions more. Yet, not one death or illness can be attributed
to an exposure to the public health use of DDT. Figure 1 illustrates growth in DDT research,
with numbers of published papers doubling from one decade to the next. Almost all papers
are in environmental literature and many are on potential adverse effects of DDT. Only a small
proportion of papers deal with malaria and DDT. It bears repeating that DDT is a spatial
repellent, and hardly an insecticide at all, but a search on DDT and repellents will produce
even fewer papers. This disparity represents an egregiously disproportionate emphasis on
non-sources of harm compared to the enormous harm of malaria.
The US used DDT to eradicate malaria. After malaria disappeared as an endemic disease
people in the US became richer. They built better and more enclosed houses. They screened
their windows and doors. They air-conditioned their homes. Also, during those early years,
the US developed an immense arsenal of mosquito control tools and chemicals. Today, when
there is a risk of mosquito borne disease, urban and rural areas can bring this arsenal to bear
and quickly eliminate risks. And, as illustrated by aerial spray missions in the aftermath of
hurricane Katrina, they can afford to do so. Yet, those modern and very expensive chemicals
are not what protect the US from introductions of the old diseases. Use of those chemicals can
only respond to a threat; it cannot prevent the old diseases from being reintroduced. What
protects US populations is their enclosed, screened, air-conditioned housing, the physical
representation of their wealth. Their wealth and living standards stop dengue at the border
with Mexico, not the use of insecticides. Stopping mosquitoes from entering and biting people
inside their homes is critical in the prevention of malaria and many other insect-borne diseases.
This is what DDT does for poor people in poor countries. It stops large proportions of
mosquitoes from entering houses. It is, in fact, a form of chemical screening, and until people
in disease endemic countries can afford properly enclosed houses and physical screening, or
it is provided for them, chemical screening is the only kind they have.
Perspectives on Barriers to Control of Anopheles Mosquitoes and Malaria
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/55466
657
DDT is a protective tool that has been taken away from countries around the world, mostly
due to governments acceding to the whims of the anti-pesticide wing of environmentalism,
but it is not only the anti-pesticide wing that lobbies against DDT. The activists have a
sympathetic lobbying ally in the pesticide industry. DDT opposition was made clear in
writings of those within the insecticide industry; a Bayer official stated:
[I speak] Not only as the responsible manager for the vector control business in Bayer, being the market leader in vector control
and pointing out by that we know what we are talking about and have decades of experiences in the evolution of this very particu‐
lar market. [but] Also as one of the private sector representatives in the RBM Partnership Board and being confronted with that
discussion about DDT in the various WHO, RBM et al circles. So you can take it as a view from the field, from the operational
commercial level - but our companies [sic] point of view. I know that all of my colleagues from other primary manufacturers and
internationally operating companies are sharing my view. [45]
The official goes on to say that,
DDT use is for us a commercial threat (which is clear, but it is not that dramatical [sic] because of limited use), it is mainly a
public image threat.
However the most damming part of this message was the statement that,
...we fully support EU to ban imports of agricultural products coming from countries using DDT...
This email message from Bayer, one of the largest global manufacturers of alternatives to DDT,
provides clear evidence of industry applying international and developed country pressures
to stop poor countries from using DDT to control malaria. This message also shows the
complicity of the insecticide industry in those internationally orchestrated efforts.
The environmental movement lobbied for a WHA resolution that required countries to move
away from using insecticides in disease control altogether [23]. The WHA is the premier policy-
setting forum for all health issues and is the governing body of the WHO. At that time, 1997,
there was no evidence that vector-borne diseases could be controlled without man-made
insecticides. The same is true today. The resolution was adopted by the WHA in 1997.
Essentially, the lobbying of environmental groups elevated politics and anti-insecticide
sentiment above scientific evidence and left hundreds of millions at high risk of death and
illness from entirely preventable diseases. As we will show in the next section, UNEP has a
particularly odious history of elevating environmental politics over science.
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11. UNEP’s war against PHIs
The UN Stockholm Convention on POPs, which came into force in 2004, governs the use of
DDT. DDT is the only chemical under the POPs Convention that is granted an exemption for
use in public health. It is against this background that the Stockholm Convention Secretariat
(the Secretariat) and the financial mechanism of the Convention, the GEF, the UNEP, and
groups within the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and WHO, have engaged in
scientific malfeasance to achieve political goals. UNEP’s target goal in 2007, now removed from
the UNEP website, was DDT elimination by 2020.1
The GEF was established in 1991 and is a partnership of 10 agencies, including the World Bank,
which houses the GEF. The GEF has allocated over $9bn in funds for projects with the aim of
improving the environment and has raised over $40bn from other partners for its projects. At
stake is not only increased power over the use of chemicals for the control of diseases but also
the reputational benefits of achieving a goal deemed desirable by environmental groups. In
addition, one cannot discount the fact that many millions of dollars are programmed by
numerous governments via the UN system to rid the world of POPs and find alternatives to
DDT. Control over the use of insecticides for public health also gives agencies control over,
and benefit from, these funds.
UNEP’s and GEF's misrepresentations of scientific records against the use of DDT and other
PHIs were exposed in a peer-reviewed paper in Research and Reports in Tropical Medicine [46].
The paper exposed the false claims about an insecticide-free malaria control project managed
by UNEP and financed by GEF in Mexico and Central America (Mexico/CA). The project was
designed to demonstrate successful control of malaria through use of “environmentally
sound” methods without DDT and other insecticides. Almost inevitably, the projects’ backers
claimed it achieved this objective. A proper analysis of epidemiologic data, however, revealed
no such success; reductions in malaria cases and deaths in the region were achieved primarily
through pharmacosuppression (therapeutic and prophylactic use of anti-malarial drugs).
Claims that UNEP’s environmental interventions were effective were invalid.
The project, Regional Program of Action and Demonstration of Sustainable Alternatives to
DDT for Malaria Vector Control in Mexico and Central America (Mexico/CA Project), was
conducted in eight countries (Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama and El Salvador). It was executed by PAHO’s Sustainable Development and Envi‐
ronmental Health Program and implemented by UNEP. It was co-financed by the GEF with
additional support from the Commission for Environmental Cooperation of North America
(CEC), PAHO, and participating country governments. The project’s aim was to improve
coordination and national capacity so that new, integrated disease vector (mosquito) control
techniques could be implemented, thereby eliminating the need for DDT reintroduction [47].
The objectives of the project (as stated by UNEP) were to: “Demonstrate feasibility of integrated
1 The Stockholm Convention is a UN Convention that arose from UN Environment Program efforts to control and/or
ban the production and use of certain persistent organic pollutants. PAHO is an international public health agency and
is the Regional Office for the Americas of the WHO and part of the UN.
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and environment-friendly methods for malaria vector control without the use of DDT,” and
“assess the effects of these methods on malaria occurrence [48].”
According to UNEP, the key interventions in the project were as follows: 1) Reduction of
contact between mosquitoes and people via treated bed nets; meshes on doors and windows;
the planting of repellent trees like neem and oak; and the liming of households. 2) Control of
breeding sites by clearing vegetation; draining stagnant water, ditches and channels; and the
use of biological controls such as fish and bacteria in some countries. 3) Elimination of places
near houses that attract and shelter mosquitoes through, for example, the cleaning and tidying
up of areas in and around homes, alongside the promotion of personal hygiene [49].
The project’s final evaluation, published in November 2009, mentions various pharmaceutical
methods of prophylaxis and treatment within human populations [50]. However, those
methods were ongoing components of malaria control in each country prior to the Mexico/CA
Project, operating nationally in each country before and during the project. The available
evidence suggests national malaria control programs (NMCPs) functioned regardless of the
presence or absence of UNEP’s project personnel. Thus, anti-malarial treatment (the major
component of the NMCPs) in demonstration areas was not part of the epidemiological
evaluation of the Mexico/CA Project [51]. Likewise, use of ITNs had no obvious definable role
in the Mexico/CA Project. Project successes are therefore advertised as having been achieved
without mention of the accompanying use of insecticides.
The  project  included  demonstration  areas,  where  the  GEF  environmental  interventions
would be  implemented,  as  well  as  control  areas  within  epidemiologically  similar  areas,
where  the  interventions  would  be  excluded,  for  proper  comparisons  [51].  As  stated  by
Cesar  Chelala,  medical  consultant  affiliated  with  the  Mexico/CA  Project,  demonstration
areas were selected “based on the high incidence of transmission and the persistence of
malaria in those places [52].”
An epidemiological evaluation identified 202 demonstration areas and 51 control areas [51].
The former included a total population of 159,018 and the latter 50,834.
The public statements regarding the Mexico/CA Project proclaimed dramatic and very
impressive reductions in malaria cases for its environmentally benign interventions. The final
report of the Mexico/CA Project, published by the environmental sector of PAHO in December
2008, claims “a 63% reduction in the number of people with the disease without using DDT or
any other type of pesticide [53].”
These statistics and claims of success were repeated in an official press release issued by UNEP,
WHO and GEF in May 2009 [54]. UNEP Executive Director, Achim Steiner, also repeated these
claims and characterized the project as “calculated and tested science [49].” Similar claims have
been made in the popular media [52] and used by anti-insecticide activist groups as evidence
that malaria control is possible without insecticides [55].
Regrettably, the claims of malaria control through application of GEF interventions were
incorrect and fundamentally misleading.
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Countries in Latin America were forced away from using DDT in compliance with the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), wherein the CEC pressured Mexico in the
mid-1990s to stop production and use of DDT [56]. Without DDT, countries used more
expensive insecticides, which had to be sprayed more frequently, creating problems for
malaria control [57]. Over time, the countries in Central America moved to greater use of
pharmacosuppression. Malaria cases have fallen as a result of this widespread use of malaria
treatments, but not through the environmental controls touted by the UN. Officials of GEF,
UNEP and the Secretariat, however, ignored the use of pharmacosuppression in their discus‐
sion of successful malaria control in Mexico/CA. Furthermore, these officials falsely attribute
changes in malaria burdens to GEF’s environmental interventions. A separate epidemiological
evaluation which was designed to measure any changes in disease rates, found no statistical
differences in malaria rates in demonstration areas versus rates in control areas, and this was
consistent across all eight countries [51]. Malaria rates in most countries were falling, but with
no difference between the demonstration areas and controls, the decline cannot be attributed
to the environmental interventions. But UNEP, GEF, the Secretariat and other officials ignored
those findings. Furthermore, despite the fact that the control areas were a crucially important
part of the project, they were not even mentioned in the 2008 final report [53]. Ultimately, the
successful reduction of malaria was most likely entirely due to pharmacosuppression.
One might wonder why a control program would require insecticides and vector control if
pharmacosuppression is such a powerful method of malaria control. This is a complex issue,
but it is important to note that even though reductions in malaria cases have been achieved in
Mexico and Central America, their model of widespread distribution of the anti-malarial drugs
chloroquine and primaquine is not transferable elsewhere and may not be sustainable over
the long-term. As a model for malaria control, it is not transferable for several reasons. First,
widespread drug resistance to chloroquine in Africa and Southeast Asia would mean the
intervention would be largely useless. Second, primaquine is a radical treatment for vivax
malaria, whereas in Africa over 90 percent of malaria cases are caused by falciparum malaria,
the more deadly form of the disease.2 Third, pharmacosuppression is expensive and requires
more sophisticated health systems than exist in most of Africa, where the greatest burden of
malaria lies. So even if UNEP, GEF and their partners were straightforward about the real
reasons for the declines in malaria in the project areas, there would be no reasonable argument
to claim that pharmacosuppression has any application in most other endemic areas.
Global malaria control policy gives scant notice to pharmacosuppression. In fact, it appears
that global leaders are intent on ignoring how countries of the Americas are making use of
pharmacosuppression. Yet, and as commonly observed in reports from South America, the
only cost-effective insecticides (pyrethroids) they have must be sprayed so frequently as to be
of limited value. Thus, countries of the Americas really have no viable cost-effective options
for use of PHIs. In absence of an insecticidal solution then, pharmacosuppression becomes the
best option for effectively reducing malaria caseloads.
2 In addition, there are concerns about the side effects of using primaquine among people with G6PD deficiency. See
Baird K. Eliminating malaria – all of them.Lancet 2010;376(9756): 1883-5. http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/
article/PIIS0140-6736%2810%2961494-8/fulltext (accessed 19 September 2012).
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If we assume there is a decision to keep quiet on how malaria is being controlled in absence
of insecticides, then it is easier to understand why there is less transparency in malaria data
for the Americas. Historically PAHO openly reported statistics on the numbers and types of
curative treatments dispensed per year in each country. However, transparency of malaria
control statistics is down from just two or three years ago. A visit to PAHO’s website on
interactive malaria control data for the Americas will reveal no data on numbers of treatments
with chloroquine or primaquine. Indeed, the only data that is readily available is on use of
ACTs for treating cases of falciparum malaria.
12. Conclusion
We have described the systematic and often coordinated campaigns by activists, scientists and
UN agencies against essential tools for disease control. We will conclude here with statements
that bring our analyses full circle. Rachel Carson started broad scale unscientific attacks on
DDT in 1962, with publication of her book, Silent Spring. The claims of harm by exposures to
DDT, as we describe in this chapter, were not and are not true. In other words, the attributed
harms are not caused by DDT exposures. Yet, presented in a 2012 article titled “Critisism [sic]
of Carson over DDT unfounded” is a denial of any responsibility whatsoever for the reductions
and eliminations of DDT in disease control programs as legacy of her book. In their article the
Rachel Carson Council makes the following claims: “DDT has been associated with serious
adverse effects in humans, including reduced sperm production in men, shorter lactation times
and increasing numbers of pre-term births in women,… breast cancer...[58].”
We ask the reader to compare their claims with those we describe as not meeting even minimal
criteria for cause-effect relationships. So the Rachel Carson Council denies responsibility for
harm inflicted by Carson’s anti-DDT rhetoric, while, at the same time, it continues to imple‐
ment her strategies for DDT elimination and employs her tactics of falsifying the scientific
record to scare the public. Amazingly, when the false statements and fear tactics employed by
anti-DDT campaigners succeed in stopping use of DDT to protect health and save lives, the
anti-PHI advocacy community, as revealed in the Rachel Carson Council’s denial of respon‐
sibilities, expects the public to think they had no role in such inhumanely disastrous changes
in public health policies. As we have shown, they are, in fact, the very cause of those changes
in policy.
We have shown that vast sums of money, mostly from taxpayers, have been spent over many
decades undermining and often directly attacking the use of DDT in life-saving disease control
programs. These vast expenditures have not delivered alternative strategies or tools to replace
DDT. The few alternatives that disease control programs do have for some malaria-endemic
regions pale in comparison to the powerful life-saving properties of DDT. It almost goes
without saying that if the disease control tool in question were not DDT but were a vaccine or
a medicine, there would be a sense of outrage in the general public along with well-funded
advocacy to preserve and protect a tool that has the power to save lives. Yet such is the power
of the environmental movement, that aside from a few outspoken scientists and individuals,
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there has been almost no response from the malaria community or the wider public health
community. The strategies employed by anti-DDT activists are anti-science and rely on
distortions, half-truths and sometimes outright lies. Ordinarily such behavior would be
roundly criticized, yet because DDT is being attacked, such actions are given a free pass.
We are greatly concerned that the majority of private insecticide companies far from opposing
the unscientific agenda of the anti-DDT campaigns, support them. These companies may be
merely motivated to sell more of their own product, but this is surely one of the most short-
sighted strategies imaginable. We already see a growing number of studies finding associa‐
tions between alternatives to DDT and possible human health harm. As with DDT, the anti-
insecticide activists are starting to hype and spread fear about these associations. As the
Stockholm Convention adds more and more chemicals to its list of banned or controlled
substances, and as the UNEP flexes its regulatory muscles, we fully expect it will become more
and more difficult to produce, trade, transport and use all PHIs. It is precisely because of such
restrictions that countries of the Americas have had to adopt programs of mass drug distri‐
butions (pharmacosuppression) to control vivax malaria. Basically those countries have no
cost-effective options for use of PHIs. Continuation of these anti-PHI practices, as we have
learned from history, will inflict great harm on disease control efforts and eventually exact a
heavy cost in lives from some of the poorest and most vulnerable communities on earth.
We hope this chapter has shed some light on the strategies and tactics of environmental groups,
activists, scientists and UN agencies. Well-established patterns of behavior have been set with
these groups and individuals and we hope that the malaria community and the wider public
health community begin to recognize these patterns and begin to more effectively investigate
and respond to claims against PHIs long before the claims become the basis for further
restrictions on the efficacy of disease control programs.
List of the acronyms used in the text
ACT-- artemisinin-based combination therapies
API—annual parasite index
CEC—Commission for Environmental Cooperation (The full title is North Americas Com‐
mission for Environmental Cooperation. Created as a side agreement of the North American
Free Trade Agreement.)
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EDC-- endocrine disrupting chemicals
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